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Abstract – We assess the general impact of land reforms 
on growth using human capital growth models due to 
Arrow (1962) - the main newness of the paper- after 
surveying the literature and building a typology. Thus, 
we conclude that land reform can yet been used as a 
modern tool to spur growth and development, but with 
our approach we can define the main limits and 
constraints that can block this growth. 
 We conclude that a raise in undifferentiated wages after 
land reform leads to an unrecoverable society welfare 
loss; thus, yielding a lesson to political agents’ decision-
makers elected after land reforms – wage raise land 
reform should not be used as an electoral motto.  
Keywords – Land Reform, Human Capital, Arrowian LBD, 
Don’t do land reform, Typology of land reforms  
1. Introduction: Motivation and 
object of study 
Land reform is an ancestral political economic 
instrument that has been used by governments and 
political agents in different ways. In this section, we 
try to define our notion of land reform. The literature, 
especially in economics, regarding this issue is vast. 
Therefore, we must narrow our aim at defining this 
object of study. Our definition of land reform includes 
only land redistribution from large estates 
(latifundia) to smaller ones (minifundia). Thus, we 
exclude the reverse action of gathering minifundia into 
a larger latifundia. Branco and Rocha de Sousa (2006) 
have established a typology of land reforms, using a 
matrix between the economic component and the 
political component. Below we present this definition 
on Table 1. For the economic component, we tried to 
evaluate if a land reform was well succeeded, so that 
(total factor) productivity of the land increased. For the 
political assessment, we tried to distinguish between 
revolutionary land reforms, structural change, 
accompanied by a coup d’état or revolution; and 
reformist land reforms, so that there is not a sudden 
change but a gradual and swift sustained change in 
government (Zakarya, 2004).  
 
2. Typology of land reforms 
Additionally, Kawagoe (1999) also has 
established his political economic typology of land 
reforms. 
Table 1. Actual Land Reforms 
Economic 
System 
VERS
US 
Political 
System 
 
 
CENTRALIZED 
(C) 
[+ STATE] 
 
 
DECENTRALIZE
D (D) 
[+ MARKET] 
 
 
REFORMI
ST (R) 
WITHOUT 
SUDDEN 
POLITICA
L 
CHANGE 
(WITHOU
T 
REVOLUT
ION OR 
COUP) 
(C,R) 
BRAZIL (MST 
2000); 
VIETNAM 
(1988)  
 
MOZAMBIQU
E (2004-5) 
 
(D,R) 
BRAZIL 
(CÉDULA 2000) 
JAPAN (1945);  
THAILAND 
(90’S) 
GUATEMALA 
(1952-1954) -
Arbenz Regime 
CHINA (1978-
present) 
  
STRUCTU
RAL (S) 
WITH 
SUDDEN 
POLITICA
L 
CHANGE 
(WITH 
REVOLUT
ION OR 
COUP) 
(C,S) 
PORTUGAL 
(1975) 
GUATEMALA 
(1954-1990)- 
military junta 
ZIMBABWE 
(1990-2005) 
(D,S) 
Eastern Europe 
countries after the 
fall of the Berlin 
Wall, 
e.g.. UCRAINE 
(1991)  
Source: Branco and Rocha de Sousa (2006) 
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Table 2. Feasible Land Reforms 
 Ex-Post Land Reform 
 Market Economy (M) Socialist 
 Peasant Commercial (S) 
  (p) (c)   
  Market Asian Model 
 Socialist 
Model 
Ex 
Econom
y (1.1.) (1.2.) (1.4.) 
Ante 
Peasant 
(p) 
Mp--> 
Mp Mp-> Mc Mp-->S 
    
Latin American 
Model   
Land 
Half-
feudal (3.1.) (3.2.) (3.4.) 
  (F) 
F--> 
Mp F--> Mc F-->S 
    
Transition Eco. 
Model    
Reform Socialist (4.1.) (4.2.)   
  (S) 
S--> 
Mp S--> Mc   
Source: Kawagoe (1999: 44) based on De Janvry 
(1981a, b) [also Rocha de Sousa (2006: 70)] 
 
This new table has become a kind of corner-stone 
in land reform literature. 
Our focus is on Latin American Land reforms, 
that as Kawagoe shows, resulted essentially from 
changing the mode of production from a half-feudal 
society to a market economy, whether peasant one 
(Mp) or market economy commercial (Mc). 
This is clearly a trade-off between the struggle 
movements of peasants (campesinos) and agri-
business. 
3. Latin American Land Reforms 
“Amor é latifúndio, sexo é invasão.”1  
MPB’s, singer Rita Lee 
 In this paper, we focus our analysis on Latin 
American land reforms2,3. Dorner (1991) and De 
Janvry (1981 a,b) have studied this issue at length. 
There are also several studies of peasant movements in 
Latin America, namely for MST – Movimento dos Sem 
Terra (Landless Workers) in Brazil (Masselli, 1998; 
Fernandes, 1999; Ricci, 1999). Forman (1974) 
presented the evolution of campesinos, and how the 
structure of the land defined power relations among 
different agents, also in Brazil. Wright and Wolford 
(2003) present an updated version of MST’s 
formation. Lapp (2004) scrutinizes voting power of 
campesinos for all Latin America. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Freely translated as: “Love is large estate, sex is invasion.” 
Brazilian popular singer, Rita Lee. 
2 There are a lot of studies of land reform in Africa, for the 
general case (Juul and Lund, 2002; Lund, 2002; Peters; 
2002; Manji, 2006), Ethiopia (Benin and Pender, 2001; 
Taddese; 2001), Ghana (Berry, 2002), Mozambique (Unruh, 
1998; Virtannen; 2004), Nigeria (Omotayo, 2003), Kenya 
(McPeak, 2005), Sahel (Grigsby, 2002; Thébaud, 2002), 
Senegal (Juul, 2002), South Africa (Williams et al., 1996; 
Zyl et al., 2001; Cousins, 2002), Tanzania (Wanitzek and 
Sippel, 1998) and Zimbabwe (Moyo, 2001; Hammar, 2002; 
Addison and Laakso, 2003). 
3 For Asia, there are the following studies: Bangladesh 
(Devine, 2002), Phillipines (Borras, 2003), Japan (Dore, 
1959; Hayami et al., 1991; Kawagoe, 1999), India (Banerjee 
and Iyer, 2002), Mongolia (Neupert, 1999; Fernandez-
Gimenez, 2002), Thailand (Byamugisha ,1999a, 1999b) and 
Vietnam (Ravallion and Van de Valle, 2001, 2003). 
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Figure 1. Land Gini index Comparison (1966-1990) 
 
Figure 1 presents the grassroots for all the land 
political movements, and we can observe that in Latin 
America, the Gini for land inequality had, for the 
period 1966-90, the highest average of all continents, 
respectively 81% (of a maximum allowed of 100%). 
Thus, we can state that inequality in land distribution, 
which is particularly striking in Latin America, caused 
discontent and thus political struggle for these lands. 
  The crucial nexus of the landed power is that 
land occupation, later could yield a legal title for that 
land, if it would be legally recognised by the 
government. In Brazil we have clearly two types of 
land reform: i) occupation and invasion of lands by the 
MST (the dominant one), and ii) a market led land 
reform (land bill land reform, called “Cédula da 
Terra”) in which the landless might buy land from a 
farmers’ association, with bonus interest, with a 
waiting period4 of two years, and in which they choose 
the best land for their aims, and have access to 
technical support by qualified agronomists – see 
Buainain et al. (1998; 1999a,b; 2002, 2003). 
 More than defend itself one mode or the other 
we must perceive that reality is sufficiently enough 
complex in order to comply both systems. 
 Nevertheless, at the political economic level, 
the struggle of the farmers for better conditions has 
been for a long time in the economic literature (e.g. 
Kautsky (1898) in general, and for Portugal, Cunhal 
(1976), presented an updated version of Kautsky’s 
work.). 
                                                          
4 Or grace period, as is also usually referred in the financial 
literature, which means that the loan starts to be repaid only 
after this time has elapsed. 
 Binswanger et al. (1995) analyses the 
political landed elite relations and has become a 
classical corner-stone of this literature. Huizer’s 
(2001) work presents several recent political rooted 
campesinos movements. 
 For the case of Mexico, Bobrow-Strain 
(2007) presents the formation of Chiapas struggle, in 
which ladinos (indigenous who do not follow ancestral 
traditions) fight against traditional farmers. 
Additionally, Collier and Quaratiello (1999) abridge 
the same subject. 
 What kind of conclusion can we withdraw 
from all these studies?  
 The first point is that violence against the 
landed elite pays off for the offender, sooner or later, 
they will get a title for land that they eventually can 
negotiate and enter again in the political struggle for 
new lands. Of course, there is some risk in this 
struggle, some landless workers can eventually get 
killed or severally injured in the process. Buainain 
(2003) refers using CPT’s (Comissão Pastoral da 
Terra) data that in 2002, for Brazil, there were 743 
land conflicts, of which 43 deaths, 425 780 people 
involved, and 3 million ha of land involved. Figure 2, 
, next page, illustrates recent MST workers land’s 
occupation in Brazil for 2002 [Fernandes based on 
CPT, 2003]. 
 The second point, which led me further to 
study the subject, is: What are the aggregate gains or 
losses of land reform? 
 
Figure 1: Land Gini Index Comparison (1966-90) 
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 Do the gains of some outreach the losses of 
others, in a sense that we can talk about a net welfare 
gain? 
 One of us addressed this issue of analysing 
the aggregate effect of land reform on growth, as 
defined on the first section (a redistribution of large 
estate to smaller productive estates) using Arrow’s 
learning by doing (LBD) growth model. The novelty 
of this approach is the use of human capital in the 
assessment of land reform.   
4. Some General theory about Land 
Reforms 
4.1. Arrowian Human Capital Loss 
This section is based upon one of us unpublished 
work Rocha de Sousa (2008), and basically confirms 
theoretically what we have found empirically 
regarding human capital importance on land reforms. 
We use Arrow’s (1962) economic growth model 
with “learning by doing” (LBD) to evaluate and assess 
the aggregate loss of welfare due to land reform. 
Besides, we use Arrow’s model adapted with human 
capital. 
Main Hypothesis:  During traditional land 
reform all the human capital is destroyed since we 
have the substitution of experienced managers 
(agronomists) by farmers (campesinos) with few or at 
all no experience. 
This hypothesis will be further enlarged to partial 
human capital loss. 
Main Question:  
How many years does it take to recover human 
capital loss due to land reform? 
 
We have the stream of future profits (S) with 
human capital: 
 
   . .
0
. ( ) . 1 . .
T
t tS e H t W e dt  
(1) 
In which is the inter-temporal discount rate (or 
the interest rate or opportunity cost of project’s 
evaluation), 
 ( )H t
is a production function which 
results from human capital investment till moment t, 
and  represents unitary profit derived from 
a wage cost W, with  denoting wage growth rate. 
So we must now compare two profits streams: the 
discounted agronomist’s profit flow since the 
beginning till the time of land reform (SAGN), with 
the profits campesinos flow since the time of land 
reform till a period in which all the human capital is 
recovered (T**), and we name it (STB): 
 
   . .
0
. ( ) . 1 . .
RAT
t t
AGNS e H t W e dt
  
(2) 
 
   
**
. .. ( ) . 1 . .
RA
T
t t
TB RA
T
S e H t T W e dt   
(3) 
 
Hypothesis 2: we assume that the interest rate
is the same (i.e. is not affected by land reform), that 
wage growth rate, , is the same and that the 
production 
 ( )H t
and the profit rate is also the 
same: . 
Do notice that these hypotheses can be changed 
without major changes in the quality of the model’s 
results. 
 
Dynamic Recovery Threshold of Traditional 
Land Reform (DRTTLR) 
In this analysis we aim to compare SAGN and 
STB to obtain T**. This is the time value from which 
after a land reform all human capital is totally 
recovered by the farmers/campesinos. 
The following condition allows us to formalize 
DRTTLR: 
     (4) 
Thus, replacing by the respective function 
discounted cash-flows values: 
𝑆𝑇𝐵 =  ∫ 𝑒
−𝜌.𝑡
𝑇∗∗
𝑇𝑅𝐴
. 𝛾[𝐻(𝑡 − 𝑇𝑅𝐴)]. (1 − 𝑊. 𝑒
𝜃.𝑡). 𝑑𝑡 ≥ 
≥ ∫ 𝑒−𝜌.𝑡
𝑇𝑅𝐴
0
. 𝛾[𝐻(𝑡)]. (1 − 𝑊. 𝑒𝜃.𝑡). 𝑑𝑡 = 𝑆𝐴𝐺𝑁 
 (5) 

1 . tW e



1 . tW e
TB AGNS S
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Like all variables and integrand functions (given 
all our restrictive initial hypotheses) are the same, the 
DRTTLR analysis is based upon the integration limits: 
 
**
0
(´ ). (´ ).
RA
RA
TT
RA
T
Z t T dt Z t dt  
 (6) 
Thus, solving for the gain function (Z(t)): 
 
**( ) ( ) ( ) (0)RA RA RA RAZ T T Z T T Z T Z      
(7) 
Which will be equivalent, since 
( ) (0)RA RAZ T T Z   can be eliminated by being 
common to both members, and if Z(t) monotonously 
increasing5: 
**( ) ( )RA RAZ T T Z T    (8) 
**( ) 2. ( )RAZ T Z T   (9) 
From here we can derive that the dynamic 
profitability comes defined by the implicit function. 
By the injectivity of the gain function (Z(.)) we can 
state that the gains on the threshold T** have to exceed 
at least the double of accumulated gains till land 
reform. 
Figure 2 presents the Possibility Set of Land 
Reform (PSLR), accordingly to the condition of 
recovery of human capital loss in the space of possible 
gains (Z(T**) vs Z(TRA)). 
 
                                                          
5 The initial hypothesis I used was the separability of the 
function, but this one is too restrictive. It is enough to state 
Figure 2. Possibility Sets of Land Reform on 
ARROW’s model (1962) 
For a simple case in which the gain function is 
linear (thus T**=2TRA), it is the inferior line which 
defines the Possibility Set of land Reform (PSLR)– see 
next figure 3. 
Figure 3. Possibility Sets of Land Reform with linear 
gain in ARROW (1962) 
Some interesting questions might arise in this 
model in which we proceed to land reform (even 
without formal land variable). Let us change the wage 
growth. 
Hypothesis 3 
If the growth wage rate increases due to a process 
of land reform, what happens to the dynamic recovery 
threshold of land reform (DRTTLR)? 
that the function is increasingly monotonous to withdraw the 
conclusion in the text. 
Z(T1) Z(TRA) 
Z(T2)=2.Z(T1) 
Bissectrix 
PSLR 
Z(T2) 
FLR Z(T**) 
T1 TRA 
T2=2.T1 
Bissectrix 
PSLR 
T2 
FLR T** 
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Let’s analyse the cash-flow condition of an ex-
post wage rate increase after the land reform, i.e. with 
, we will have the following condition: 
𝑆𝑇𝐵(. ; 𝜃2) =  ∫ 𝑒
−𝜌.𝑡
𝑇∗∗
𝑇𝑅𝐴
. 𝛾[𝐻(𝑡 − 𝑇𝑅𝐴)]. (1 − 𝑊. 𝑒
𝜃2.𝑡). 𝑑𝑡
≥ 
≥ ∫ 𝑒−𝜌.𝑡
𝑇𝑅𝐴
0
. 𝛾[𝐻(𝑡)]. (1 − 𝑊. 𝑒𝜃1.𝑡). 𝑑𝑡 = 𝑆𝐴𝐺𝑁(. ; 𝜃1) 
      (10) 
This condition will be the one which will allow in 
this context that land reform recovered all the lost 
human capital. 
 
 Results of the Arrowian model 
Proposition 1: 
An increase in the growth rate of (unskilled6) 
wages ex-post land reform   yields land reform 
unviable in terms of economic efficiency. Thus, in this 
context and under the referred hypotheses there will be 
an aggregate welfare loss which yields in dynamic 
terms land reform inefficient; i.e. the loss generated by 
the eviction of agronomists and by theirs human 
capital loss will never be recovered with wage 
increase.7 
Demonstration: see Rocha de Sousa (2008: 224-
5). 
Proposition 2 
If there is a decrease on wage growth rate after 
land reform, then it is possible to define a new 
possibility set of land reform accordingly to the 
Dynamic Recovery Threshold of Traditional Land 
Reform. 
Demonstration: See Rocha de Sousa (2008: 225-
6). 
 
                                                          
6 We refer to unskilled or undifferentiated wages, thus to 
non-specific functions and for those which do not demand 
human capital – thus for factor L and not H. This proposition 
becomes interesting because empirically tends to be checked 
as after land reform there tends to have an increase in these 
types of wages due to the greater lobbying union power – 
specially on those LR of the more interventionist type. 
Proposition 3 
If the inter-temporal discount rate increases 
ceteris paribus the Dynamic Recovery Threshold of 
Traditional Land Reform becomes unattainable, thus 
land reform is inefficient.  
Demonstration: Rocha de Sousa (2008:226). 
Proposition 4 
If the inter-temporal discount rate decreases 
ceteris paribus the Dynamic Recovery Threshold of 
Traditional Land Reform becomes more easily 
attainable. 
Demonstration: Rocha de Sousa (2008: 227). 
Hypothesis 4 – New working hypothesis – 
partial human capital destruction 
If the eviction of agronomists by campesinos, 
instead of being totally un-experienced and illiterate, 
they inherit some experience, thus human capital loss 
is only partial. 
If we can measure it by a factor of literacy8 which 
we name , then part of them are not totally un-
experienced  in terms of farm management and 
agricultural techniques. These campesinos might 
possess some knowledge of phyto-sanitary and 
modern agronomy techniques. Nevertheless, even if 
we assume a decrease on the knowledge gap, we still 
assume certain uniformity on the literacy and 
numeracy differentials between agronomists and 
campesinos. 
Question 2: What happens to Land Reform in 
this setting? 
Human capital recovery will be faster. 
Demonstration: 
Intuitively the human capital loss will be lower in 
the land reform moment, i.e. there is a kind of heritage 
from agronomists to campesinos – thus the Dynamic 
Recovery Threshold of Land Reform can be more 
easily attained than in the initial case. 
Formally we must compare: 
7 Notice we are considering T** fixed. This result might 
change with T** variable, but within Arrow’s model capital 
(in our case human capital) tends to have a finite life, and 
thus the plausibility of this hypothesis. 
8 Illiteracy rate (%) will be obviously 0 ≤ (Illiteracy = 1 – 
η) ≤ 1. 
 
2 1 
2 1  
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 1TB AGNS S     (11) 
Thus, the term 
. AGNS  is the bequest or heritage 
from agronomist to campesinos, and so the human 
capital recovery must occur only till: 
 1 AGNS . 
Formally: 
 
𝑆𝑇𝐵 =  ∫ 𝑒
−𝜌.𝑡
𝑇∗∗
𝑇𝑅𝐴
. 𝛾[𝐻(𝑡 − 𝑇𝑅𝐴)]. (1 − 𝑊. 𝑒
𝜃.𝑡). 𝑑𝑡 ≥ 
≥ (1 − 𝜂) ∫ 𝑒−𝜌.𝑡
𝑇𝑅𝐴
0
. 𝛾[𝐻(𝑡)]. (1 − 𝑊. 𝑒𝜃.𝑡). 𝑑𝑡
= (1 − 𝜂). 𝑆𝐴𝐺𝑁 
     (12) 
Thus, proceeding as in the initial case, we must 
take into account 
. AGNS , and solving it for the gain 
function (Z(t)): 
  
𝑍(𝑇∗∗ − 𝑇𝑅𝐴) − 𝑍(𝑇𝑅𝐴 − 𝑇𝑅𝐴) ≥ 
≥ (1 − 𝜂). [𝑍(𝑇𝑅𝐴) − 𝑍(0)] 
     (13) 
Which will lead equivalently, given 
( ) (0)RA RAZ T T Z   might be eliminated as a 
common term, and if Z(t) is monotonously increasing 
and injective: 
 **( ) ( ) 1 . ( )RA RAZ T Z T Z T    (14) 
 **( ) 2 . ( )RAZ T Z T    (15) 
From here we withdraw the dynamic profitability 
condition in which DRTTL (T**) comes define by the 
implicit function. Given the injectivity of the gain 
function, the gains on the threshold T** must exceed 
the double minus the literacy rate of the accumulated 
profits till the moment of land reform. 
Notice that if the literacy rate is null, then we will 
be in the case of figure 2, if the literacy rate is 100%, 
then we will be in the case that the DRTTL will be the 
bissectrix. 
For an intermediate case (namely for the case of 
developing countries), if the literacy rate is 50%, then 
the frontier will be defined as: 
**( ) 1,5. ( )RAZ T Z T
. 
Figure 4. PSLR Expansion with Literacy 
increase () 
  
Proposition 5: An increase in the literacy rate 
leads to a campesinos’ DRTTL improvement and to an 
expansion of the PSLR.  
As a conclusion of the previous section, the 
increase on the literacy rate leads to an improvement 
on the dynamic recovery threshold of land reform, i.e. 
the partial recovery of human capital leads to a more 
easily viable land reform for campesinos (and 
landless), which results itself on an expansion of the 
possibility set of land reforms. 
Demonstration: see figure 5.1.3 and Rocha de 
Sousa (2008:228-9) 
The learning effects induced in this Arrow (1962) 
context due to an increase in literacy, can be checked 
empirically as we check on the literature e.g. on Brazil. 
This further emphasizes the role of human capital, its 
transmission (bequest or heritage) and its’ further 
enabling viability of land reform. 
5. Conclusion 
“Rocha de Sousa (2005) examines whether 
instituting land reform (an issue especially 
relevant in Latin America) will accelerate or 
decelerate growth. Land reform splits large 
properties run by well-educated owners into 
smaller properties run by uneducated farmers. 
Hence, a trade-off. Splitting up large properties 
increases competition and efficiency while at the 
Bissectrix 
PSLR0 
2 1Z(T ) (2- ).Z(T )
2 1Z(T ) Z(T )
2 1Z(T ) 2.Z(T )
Z(TRA) 
Z(T**) 
 
0 ( 0)FLR  
 1 12FLR  
2 ( 1)FLR  
Z(T1) 
Z0(T2) 
Z1(T2) 
Z2(T2) 
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same time entails the loss of human capital. The 
relative size of the two effects will determine the 
effect of land reform on growth.” in Roufagalas 
(2006:3). 
We might conclude from section 1, as we defined 
land reform as redistribution operated by splitting 
large estates into smaller ones, that we can define in 
section 2 a typology of land reforms as in table 1, 
describing the degree of market intervention (whether 
it is centralized or decentralized (C,D)) versus the 
degree of political change (whether it is reformist or 
structural (R,S)), that is if we have a continuous and 
gradual swift change or instead a coup or political 
revolution. Table 2 realized actual processes of land 
reform, in which we classified MST movement as 
centralized in the economic sphere and reformist in the 
political one (C,R) as opposed to the market led land 
bill (Cédula da Terra) which we characterized  as 
decentralized (pro-market) and reformist in the 
political domain, thus Cédula was on the (D,R) cell. 
We also presented another approach due to Kawagoe 
which further characterized land reforms in Latin 
America, stating that they operate a change from a 
half-feudal economic system to a market or peasant 
economy. 
We also briefly characterized peasant or 
campesinos movements in Latin America, with more 
emphasis on Brazil, besides focusing on Latin 
America as the most unequal distribution of land, as 
measured by the Land Gini Index (81%) – see Fig.1.  
The main conclusion is that as we might have 
inferred from section 1 that land was an economic 
asset, also on section 3, we can conclude that land is a 
political asset – to stress this more see Lapp (2004), 
where she scrutinizes relations between land tenancy 
and political power. The second point of section 3 is 
that violence against the landed elite pays-off for the 
offender, sooner or later, they will get a title for land, 
and eventually can negotiate it, and re-enter again in 
the struggle for new lands. Of course there is some risk 
involved, they can get killed or severally injured in the 
process. 
  Elsewhere, we estimated a stochastic Cobb-
Douglas production frontier to assess the economic 
efficiency of “Cédula da Terra”. We concluded that 
there are five major variables which reduce technical 
inefficiency: human capital, in its general form, that is 
education or schooling and its specific form, technical 
assistance, besides access to credit, the value of social 
production and the value of self-consumption. 
On section 4 we modeled the impact of land 
redistribution on growth, through human capital 
destruction. To our main question how many years 
would it take for campesinos to recover the loss of 
human capital due to the eviction of agronomists, we 
concluded that it would take about the double time it 
had passed till the date of land reform.  
On section 4 we explored the results of the 
models: under certain hypotheses, constancy of 
interest rate, production function, wage growth rate, 
we conclude on Proposition 1, that if there was an 
increase of (unskilled) wages due to greater union 
power due to the land reform, then land reform would 
be totally inefficient- there would never be a recovery 
of these human capital losses by campesinos. 
Proposition 3 yields the same result for the increase of 
the inter-temporal discount or interest rate. 
Besides we extended the model to comply partial 
destruction of human capital, allowing it to have a 
bequest from the eviction of the agronomist to the new 
campesino (it could be a former employee of the 
agronomist). This yielded that the recovery of (partial) 
human capital loss would be faster, which is natural 
due to accumulated learning by doing processes. Thus, 
literacy and numeracy increase the pace of recovery. 
Our main conclusion:  land is both a political 
and economic asset and our main policies for land 
reform should be market led if we want to keep up 
with economic efficiency, as we have shown 
theoretically and in an applied case for Brazil; 
One should promote credit and technical 
assistance as a first line priority and in the longer run 
try to foster education, as a last resort to withdraw 
campesinos from the poverty equilibria they are 
trapped on. These kinds of policies will pay off in the 
long run by including poor people in society and 
promoting simultaneously more efficiency and equity.  
We have also shown that this particular case of 
Brazil can be of special relevance in all Latin America, 
where the Gini index for land inequality stands out as 
the most striking one. Nevertheless, we built a 
theoretical model, that is more robust, a general model 
of Arrowian human capital loss that yields conditions 
for the viability of land reforms. For instance, a land 
reform that is followed by wage growth, after human 
capital destruction, will be mostly irrecoverable. Thus, 
the following motto, derived from a theorem, land 
reform cannot be followed by wage growth, because 
if so, social welfare will never be recovered. 
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